This paper discusses a bimodal hybrid language with a sub-modality (called the irreflexive modality) associated with the intersection of the accessibility relation R and the inequality =. First, we provide the Hilbert-style axiomatizations (with and without the COV-rule) for logics of our language, and prove the Kripke completeness and the finite frame property for them. Second, with respect to the frame expressive power, we compare our language containing the irreflexive modality with the hybrid languages H and H(E). Finally, we establish the Goldblatt-Thomason-style characterization for our language.
Introduction and Motivation
As is well known, the standard modal propositional language M with ♦ cannot define all the natural assumptions about the accessibility relation R on the set W of states, e.g., irreflexivity and antisymmetry. It has known that we can prove the completeness with respect to the frames with undefinable properties by adding Gabbay-style non-orthodox rules without changing the language [10, 11] . In order to overcome the lack of expressive power of M, on the other hand, extensions with various tools have been proposed, e.g., the difference operator D [8] , nominals i [4] , the global modality E [12] , and the satisfaction operator @ i [6] .
For the same reason, the author of the present paper [16, 18, 19] proposed a new modest extension M( ) of M, which consisted in adding an operator associated with the intersection of the accessibility relation R and the inequality = (written (R∩ =)). E.g., in tense logic, ϕ means that ϕ holds in some future instant different from now. He [16, 18] has already proved that various normal modal logics (some of which are kinds of Lemmon-Scott's Axioms ♦ m n p → j ♦ k p (m, n, j, k ∈ ω)) in his extended language enjoy Kripke completeness (for some logics containing K, even in the predicate extension [17] ) and the finite model property. He [19] has also shown that ♦p → p defines irreflexivity and p → p defines the conjunction of antisymmetry and transitivity, though antisymmetry is not independently definable. The definability of these properties of frames witnesses the strength of his extension. In addition, the author and Sato recently have provided the Van Benthem-style and Goldblatt-Thomason-style Characterizations for his extension [20] .
We can point out that has a close connection with topological semantics for modal logics. ♦ has been topologically interpreted in at least two ways: as the closure operator or as the derivative operator. '♦ as derivative' has been studied by e.g., [9] . By the recent work [2] (especially, Lemmas 1.62 and 1.64), we can understand that '♦ as derivative' has the same meaning as our in the relational semantics. Thus, we can claim that the author's studies about contain, as a special case, a relational-semantical study of '♦ as derivative'. In fact, when ♦ satisfies the axioms for S4, , associated with (R∩ =), satisfies those for wK4 [2, sec.3.1.1], which is the basic axiom system for '♦ as derivative' (Note that, if ♦ satisfies the reflexivity axiom T: p → ♦p at least, ♦p is equivalent to p ∨ p).
Topological semantics for hybrid logic have been studied by, e.g., [21, 23] . Most of these works deal with ♦ as the closure operator. There has been no study that tried to interpret ♦ as the derivative operator in the framework of hybrid logics. This paper is a preliminary step toward this. In this paper, we hybridize our M( ) and intend to give a relational basis for topological hybrid logics with '♦ as derivative'.
We add a new sort of variables, nominals, which will be formulas used to denote points in the domains in the Kripke frames (H( ) denotes this hybridization of M( )). Nominals also allow us to define irreflexivity. Therefore, the expressive powers of nominals and the irreflexive modality overlap. We reveal the difference between the irreflexive modality and nominals with respect to the expressive powers and meta-logical properties.
Hybridization of our extension is also inspired by [13] (cf. [1, sec.2.2]). They showed that intersection of accessibility relations can be defined using nominals. For , this means that the axiom scheme i ↔ ♦i ∧ Di holds, where i is a nominal and D is the difference operator associated with the inequality =. In addition, they also showed that complement of the accessibility relation can be defined by nominals. Since the axiom scheme i ↔ ¬ Di holds, we obtain the following scheme:
We use such a scheme to provide our Hilbert-style axiomatization by using the traditional notion of possibility forms [14] (and the COV-rule [13] ). We also show that hybridization of M( ) preserves Kripke completeness and the finite frame property (Section 3). Second, with respect to the frame expressive power, we compare our languages containing the irreflexive modality with the hybrid languages H and H(E). Finally, we give the Goldblatt-Thomason-style characterization for H( ) (Section 4).
Basic Notions

Syntax and Semantics
The irreflexive hybrid language H( ) is obtained by the basic modal language M containing ♦ with an infinite set of nominals Nom = { i, j, k, . . . } and the irreflexive modality . The set of irreflexive hybrid formulas is defined as
where p ∈ Prop, the set of all proposition letters, and i is a nominal. It is usually assumed that the set of nominals Nom as well as Prop is countable.
We define the following languages and their formulas similarly: The hybrid language H without , the irreflexive modal language M( ) without Nom, and their extension with the global modality E (written, e.g., H( , E)). In addition to the usual abbreviations for material implication →, disjunction ∨, logical equivalence ↔, the falsum ⊥, we use the following: ϕ := ¬ ♦ ¬ ϕ, ϕ := ¬ ¬ ϕ. We use ϕ, ψ, θ, . . . to denote formulas and Γ, Δ, . . . to sets of formulas. A formula ϕ is called pure if it contains no proposition letters (nominals are allowed).
A bimodal frame is a triple F = W, R, S of a non-empty set W , called a domain, and two binary relations R, S on W . A bimodal model is a pair M = F, V of a bimodal frame F = W, R, S and a mapping V : Prop ∪ Nom → P(W ) with |V (i)| = 1 for any i ∈ Nom. A unimodal frame and a unimodal model are defined similarly. | M | (or | F |) means the domain of a model M (or, a frame F, respectively). For any binary relation R on W , R[w] denotes { w | wRw }.
For a bimodal model M = W, R, S, V (or unimodal model M = W, R, V ), w ∈ W and a formula ϕ of H( ) (or H, respectively), the satisfaction relation M, w ϕ is defined as usual. We assume that ♦ is associated with R, i.e., M, w ♦ϕ ⇐⇒ [wRw and M, w ϕ] for some w , and that is associated with S. For E, the satisfaction is defined as follows:
. ϕ is valid in a class F of frames (written F ϕ) if it is valid in every F ∈ F. For a set of formulas, these notions are defined similarly. A set Γ of formulas defines a class F of frames if, for all frames F, F Γ ⇐⇒ F ∈ F. A class F of frames is modally definable if there is some set of formulas that defines F.
A bimodal frame W, R, S satisfying S = (R∩ =) is called an H( )-frame, where w(R∩ =)w means that wRw and w = w . The notion of H( )-model is defined similarly. Thus, for any H( )-model M, M, w ϕ ⇐⇒ [w(R∩ =)w implies M, w ϕ] for some w . Observe that an H( )-frame W, R, (R∩ =) (or -model) is determined by the unimodal frame W, R (or model, respectively). Therefore, we often regard W, R as H( )-frame W, R, (R∩ =) .
Unimodal and Bimodal p-morphisms
Definition 2.1 Let F = W, R, S and F = W , R , S be bimodal frames. A mapping f : W → W is a bimodal p-morphism from F to F (written f : F → F ) if it satisfies the following:
• (R-back) If f (w)R v , then wRv and f (v) = v for some v ∈ W , and (S-forth) and (S-back) defined similarly.
For bimodal models M and M , f :
for each a ∈ Prop ∪ Nom and each w ∈ |M|.
If there is a bimodal p-morphism f from M to M such that f is surjective as a mapping between domains, M is called a p-morphic image of M (written M M ).
Given two unimodal frames (or models) unimodal p-morphism between frames (or models, respectively), is defined by using the clauses (R-forth) and (R-back).
It is known that the following holds (see, e.g., Blackburn's thesis [3, Lemma 3.2.2]. He stated the tense logical analogue, though the generalization to H( ) (or H) is obvious). Note that a surjective p-morphism between frames does not preserve validity for the modal language with nominals [3, sec 3.2.3].
The following is an application of Fact 2.2, i.e., a unimodal p-morphism between models preserves the satisfaction: Proposition 2.3 There exists no formula ϕ(q) of H containing q such that M, w ψ ⇐⇒ M, w ϕ(ψ), for any ψ, any model M and any w ∈ |M|. In other words, is not definable in H in the level of models.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that is definable in H in the level of models. Then we define ¬ i by H-formulas ϕ( ¬ i). Consider two models and a unimodal p-morphism:
Remark that f : |M 1 | → |M 2 | in the proof is not a bimodal p-morphism between H( )-models. Consider the following model and mapping g : |M 3 | → |M 1 |:
where V 3 (i) = { x } for any i ∈ Nom, and g(x) = a, g(2m) = b and g(2m + 1) = c for any m ∈ ω. Then, g is a bimodal p-morphism between H( )-models.
Next, we introduce the notion of realizations. This is a generalization of bulldozing in hybrid logics (see, e.g., [3, ch.5] 
Definition 2.4 Let
surjective as a mapping between domains, we call f a -realizer and M a -realization of M.
Proposition 2.5
Suppose that a bimodal model M = W, R, S, V satisfies (R∩ = ) ⊂ S ⊂ R and that, for any i ∈ Nom, wSw fails where { w } = V (i). Then, M has a -realization.
, where we may assume
Note that V is a valuation since |V (i)| ≥ 1 by the surjectiveness of f and |V (i)| ≤ 1 by the injectiveness of f W − . It suffices to prove that f is a bimodal p-morphism from W , R , S to W, R, S . Since f is surjective by definition and xR y is equivalent to f (x)Rf (y) for any x, y ∈ W , we have (R-forth) and (R-back). It is easy to see that (S-forth) and (S-back) hold. 2
Kripke Completeness and Finite Frame Property
We axiomatize the irreflexive hybrid logic of H( ) using Goldblatt's notion of a possibility form [14] . 
Definition 3.2 Axiomatization of K H( ) is given as follows:
(Taut) ϕ, for all classical tautologies ϕ; ( 2) is valid.
From ( 2), (M1) and (M2), we deduce that
i ↔ ♦i ∧ ¬ i. Remark that p → ¬ p is not valid on any H( )-frames, though
Fact 3.3 The following are theorems and a derived rule of
, where m 1 , m 2 and m are PFs and i ∈ Nom.
Let K be the class of all H( )-frames.
Proposition 3.4 For any
Proof. By induction on K H( ) ϕ. Note that (M1) defines (R∩ =) ⊂ S, (M2) defines S ⊂ R and ( 2) defines the irreflexivity of S. With respect to (N1) and (COV), adding does not change the usual argument for soundness of hybrid logic (see, e.g., [12, Proposition 5.1] for (COV)). 2
Kripke Completeness without (COV)
Let Γ be a set of H( ). We say that Γ is maximal if, for any ϕ of H( ), ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ ϕ ∈ Γ. For any K H( ) -logic (or, K + H( ) -logic, respectively) Λ, we say that Γ is Λ-consistent if Γ Λ ⊥ and Γ is Λ-maximal consistent if Γ is maximal and consistent with respect to Λ.
Definition 3.5
The canonical bimodal frame F K H( ) is defined as follows:
• wSw ⇐⇒ [ ϕ ∈ w =⇒ ϕ ∈ w ] for any ϕ of H( ).
Definition 3.6 Let F = W, R, S and F = W , R , S be two bimodal frames. F is (bimodally) generated subframe of F (written F F) if
• (ii ) and (iii ) about S, S defined similar to (ii) and (iii).
For a subset X ⊂ W , the subframe generated by X (notation: F X ) is the smallest generated subframe of F whose domain contains X. The point-generated frame by w (notation: F w ) is F { w } where w is called the root of the frame.
(N1) (especially, Fact 3.3 (ii)) forces that in every point-generated subframe, every nominal is satisfied in at most one point as follows:
Proof. Clearly, (ii) holds. It is easy to prove that (iii) by ( 2) (see, e.g., [3, Lemma 5.1.1]). We prove (i) as follows: Assume that xRx and x = x . B ∈ x and ¬ B ∈ x for some B of H( ) since x and x are maximal consistent. Suppose for contradiction that not xSx . Then, C ∈ x and ¬ C ∈ x for some C of H( ). We have ¬ B ∧ ¬ C ∈ x whence B ∨ C / ∈ x . Since xRx , (B ∨ C) / ∈ x. By B, C ∈ x, we have B ∨ C, (B ∨ C) ∈ x and so (B ∨ C) ∧ (B ∨ C) ∈ x, which implies (B ∨ C), a contradiction.
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Then, (i) (R ∩ =) ⊂ S and S ⊂ R ; (ii) for any v in W with { v } = V (i) for some i ∈ Nom, vS v fails; (i) for any w ∈ W and for any ϕ of H( ), M , w ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ w.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are obvious by Lemma 3.8 and the construction. We can prove (iii) by induction on ϕ. Note that V is a valuation, i.e., |V (i)| = 1 for any i ∈ Nom, by Lemma 3.7 and the construction. 2 Theorem 3.10 Let ϕ be a formula of H( ).
consistent set w. Take the point-generated subframe F
M is a bimodal model. We need to duplicate the S -reflexive points in M . By Lemma 3.9 (i), (ii) and Proposition 2.5, there exists a -realization N such that f : N M for some f . However, by Lemma 3.9 (iii), M , w ¬ ϕ. Thus, N, x ¬ ϕ for some x in N with f (x) = w. Thus, we conclude that K ϕ. Definition 3.14 Let Γ be a named Λ-maximal consistent set. Define Nom as { j ∈ Nom ∪ J | m(j) ∈ Γ for some PF m }. We define the equivalence relation ∼ on Nom as follows: m(j ∧ k) ∈ Γ for some PF m. The quotient Nom / ∼ is defined as usual and [j] ∈ Nom / ∼ denotes the equivalence class of j. F Λ Γ = W, R, S is defined as follows: 
(i) is obvious by the construction and Fact 3.3 (ii). Clearly (ii) holds by Lemma 3.15. We can prove (iii) by induction on ϕ. Observe that M is a named model.
Theorem 3.17 Let λ be a pure formula and ϕ a formula of H(
where K λ is the class of frame defined by λ 3 .
Proof. Suppose that
∈ Γ and Γ is named, j ∈ Γ for some j ∈ J. Thus, j ∧ ¬ ϕ ∈ Γ. By Lemma 3.
For any substitution σ,
which implies M λ and so F λ by Fact 3.11. Since λ defines
Finite Frame Property and Decidability
Let K finite be the class of all finite H( )-frames. In this subsection, we prove that K H( ) and K + H( ) are complete with respect to K finite , i.e., we prove the finite frame property of K H( ) and K + H( ) . 
Note that V f is a valuation (see [ 
3 One of the referees of the present paper comments on (the preliminary version of) Theorem 3.17 as follows: it seems to follow directly from the existing general completeness results for pure axioms since i ↔ ♦i ∧ ¬ i is pure. If we remove ( 2) Proof. Define Σ 1 as follows:
i holds for some w. Since M is an Sirreflexivity respecting model, wSw fails. It follows from i ∈ Σ 1 that M 
is S-irreflexivity respecting.
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Theorem 3.23 Let ϕ be a formula of H(
). K finite ϕ =⇒ K + H( ) ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that
Frame Definablity
Relations between nominals and the irreflexive modality
Recall that Γ defines a class F of frames if, for all frames F, F Γ ⇐⇒ F ∈ F. As for (iii), note that S-transitivity is equivalent in the H( )-frames to the conjunction of R-transitivity and R-antisymmetry. When adding to standard modal language without nominals, we cannot define antisymmetry [20] 5 6 . We can, on the other hand, define it in H by (i ∧ ♦(j ∧ ♦i)) → j [22, p.45]. Thus, nominals increase the frame-expressive power of the irreflexive modality.
In this subsection, we deal with the following question:
(Q) Does the irreflexive modality increase the frame-expressive power of hybrid language?
Some uses of are inessential. For example, (i∧ϕ) and ϕ∨ ϕ can equally well be written (even in the level of pointed models) without using , as ♦(i∧ϕ)∧ ¬ i and ϕ ∨ ♦ϕ, respectively. In the level of frames, the following proposition demonstrates another inessential use of .
Proposition 4.2 (1)
(of H( )) defines ∀ x ∃ y [xRy and x = y]. (2) i → ♦ ¬ i (of H) also defines the same property.
As for (1) , observe that defines the seriality of S. For (2), the standard translation for hybrid languages, e.g., [5, Exercises 7.3.1] tells us the correspondence.
We have not obtained the full answer to (Q) yet. We, however, will give two partial answers to this. First answer is that increases the expressivity of H(E), where H(E) means H with the global modality E, whose accessibility relation is the total relation on W . Second answer is that, with respect to the pure formulas, increases the definability of H.
A Comparison in the Setting of Adding the Global Modality
Here, we consider the extended languages H( , E) and H(E). Recall that we define M, w Eϕ ⇐⇒ M, w ϕ for some w . We can easily prove the following:
∃ x ∃ y [xRy and x = y], however, is undefinable in H(E) 7 . To show this, we introduce the frame construction, ultrafilter morphic images [22, Definition 4.2.5].
Definition 4.4 (1) Given a binary relation R on a set W , we define a unary opera-
The bimodal ultrafilter extension ue F of F = W, R, S is the frame W ue , R ue , S ue , where W ue is the set of (principal and non-principal) ultrafilters over W , uR ue u ⇐⇒ for any X ⊂ W , X ∈ u implies m R (X) ∈ u, and S ue defined similarly by m S . The unimodal ultrafilter extension of F = W, R is W ue , R ue . Definition 4.5 Let F and G be (unimodal) frames. G is a bimodal ultrafilter mor-
Note that F is antisymmetric and F is not. Define f by f (2m) = a, f (2m + 1) = b for any m ∈ ω. Then, we can prove that f is a surjective bimodal p-morphism (in the sense of standard modal language) f : F → F, which violates antisymmetry. 6 Even if we add the global modality E in addition to , we cannot define it. This is because the surjective bimodal p-morphism with respect to R and (R∩ =) preserve frame-validity of the irreflexive modal language with the global modality. 7 Contrary to E , E(i → ♦ ¬ i) does not define ∃ x ∃ y [xRy and Next, we 'bulldoze' the non-principal ultrafilters in W ue as follows: Let P the set of all principal ultrafilters and NP the set of all non-principal ultrafil- Thus, H( , E) is more expressive than H(E) with respect to the frame definability. We can also conclude that M( , E), M( ) with E, is the different extension from H(E) (i.e., by the Gargov and Goranko Translation [12] , M(D), the unimodal language with the difference operator, associated with the inequality =).
A Comparison with respect to the Pure Formulas
Recall that a formula ϕ of H( ) (H or H(E)) is called pure if it contains no proposition letters.
The following proposition holds clearly:
In H( ) (even in M( )), we can define the atomicity by ♦ ⊥ without the assumption of transitivity.
We will prove that the properties in (2), (3) of Proposition 4.7 are not definable by pure formulas of H(E). To prove this, we introduce the following new frame construction: Definition 4.8 Let F and G be (unimodal) frames. G is an unimodal ultrafilter morphic domain of F if there is a surjective unimodal p-morphism f : ue G → F such that f P is the identity function on P , where P is the set of all principal ultrafilters u in ue G.
Ultrafilter morphic domains are different from ultrafilter morphic images in the direction of surjective unimodal p-morphisms.
It is easy to show the following Lemma. Observe, however, that the surjectiveness of f is needed for the case where ϕ is Eψ. Lemma 4.9 Let M and N be (unimodal) models. Let f : M → N be a surjective unimodal p-morphism. Then, for any formula ϕ in H(E) and any w ∈ |M|, M, w ϕ ⇐⇒ N, f(v) ϕ.
Proposition 4.10
The validity of pure formulas in H(E) is preserved under taking ultrafilter morphic domains.
Proof. Let f : ue G → F be a surjective unimodal p-morphism such that f is injective with respect to the set of all principal ultrafilters. Let ϕ be a pure formula in H(E). We prove the contraposition. Suppose that G ϕ, which implies G, V , w ϕ for some V and w ∈ |G|. From this, we can prove that ue G, V ue , u w ϕ where u w = { X ∈ P(|G|) | w ∈ X } (see, e.g., the second paragraph in the proof of [22, Proposition 4.2.6]). Observe that this inference holds even for any formulas in H(E).
Then, we define a valuation V (for Nom) on F as follows:
. This is a valuation since, for any i ∈ Nom, the element of V ue (i) is the principal ultrafilter u v where V (i) = { v } and so |V (i)| = |f [V ue (i)]|= 1 by the injectiveness of f with respect to the set of all principal ultrafilters. Clearly, for any u in ue G and any i ∈ Nom, u ∈ V ue (i) ⇐⇒ f (u) ∈ V (i). Since ue G, V ue , u w ϕ and ϕ is pure, we deduce, by Lemma 4.9, that F, V , f(u w ) ϕ hence F ϕ. 2 Proof. Consider the frame N = N, < , the natural numbers in their usual ordering. Take the ultrafilter extension ue N = N ue , < ue of N. We can divided N ue into two disjoint parts, P , the set of all principal ultrafilters, and NP , the set of all non-principal ultrafilters. As pointed out in [5, Example 2.58], this frame consists of an isomorphic copy P of natural numbers, followed by an uncountable cluster containing NP . Observe that for any pair u, u of ultrafilters, if u is non-principal, then u < ue u [5, Example 2.58]. Construct G = W , R as follows: W = P ∪{ * }, R = { u, u ∈ P 2 | u < ue u } ∪ P ×{ * } ∪ { * , * }. Define f : N ue → W as u ∈ P → u and u ∈ NP → * . Then, it is easy to see that f is a surjective unimodal p-morphism and f is an identity function with respect to P . Thus, N is an ultrafilter morphic domain of G.
G satisfies (1), (2) but F does not. Thus, by Proposition 4.10, we conclude that (1), (2) are undefinable in H(E).
Therefore, the set of pure formulas of H( ) is more expressive than that of H with respect to the frame definability.
Goldblatt-Thomason-style Characterization
In this subsection, we use some notions from first-order model theory, e.g., submodel, elementary embedding, ω-saturatedness. The reader unfamiliar with them can refer to, e.g., [7] . In addition, we drop the usual assumption that Nom and Prop of H( ) have countable members.
The notion of unimodal generated subframes are defined similar to bimodal generated subframes without using the clauses related to the second accessibility relation S. Definition 4.13 F is an hybrid amalgamation of { G k | k ∈ K } if for any (unimodal) point-generated subframe F w of F there exists k ∈ K such that F w is a proper generated subframe of G k , i.e., F w is a (unimodal) generated subframe of G k and F w = G k . For H( ), we can give the following characterization: Theorem 4. 16 An elementary frame class F is definable in H( ) iff F is closed under taking (i) bimodal ultrafilter morphic images, (ii) unimodally generated subframes, and (iii) hybrid amalgamations.
Proposition 4.12 H( )-
(
Proposition 4.14 H( )-
Proof. We will prove that the right-to-left-direction. Let Th(F) = { ϕ | F ϕ }. It suffices to prove that, for any H( )-frame F, F Th(F) =⇒ F ∈ F.
Suppose that F Th(F). Let us assume that F is unimodally point generated (Otherwise, the proof that F ∈ F is similar to the proof of [22, Theorem 4.3.4], where we need the closure condition (iii). Note that Lemmas needed there hold even in H( )). Let w be the root of F.
We can suppose that Prop ∪ Nom contains a proposition letter p X and nominal i x for each X ⊂ | F | and each x ∈ | F |, respectively. Let M = F, V 0 , where V 0 is a natural valuation with V 0 (p X ) = X and V 0 (i x ) = { x }.
Let Δ be the set consisting of the following, for all X, Y ⊂ |F| and x ∈ | F |,
